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Board Composition, Board Activities and Ownership Concentration, 
the Impact on Firm Performance 
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Abstract  
This paper investigates the impact of board composition, board activity and 
ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We found that 
independent directors enhanced a firm performance, while the board size and 
gender diversity did not affect firm value. Our results also suggest that frequent 
board meetings are negatively associated with firm value, while frequent general 
shareholder meetings are positively associated with firm value. Furthermore we 
found that both state ownership and total share ownership concentration results 
in an asymmetric U(V) shape of firm performance, while tradable share 
ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value. 
Finally, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share 
ownership concentrations have a greater firm values than companies with the highest 
levels of only a single concentration.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A feature of modern corporations is the general separation of ownership and 
management. On one hand, productivity is improved by promoting individual strength of 
managers. On the other hand, the separation incurs an agency problem that the managers 
of firms might pursue their own interests rather than the interests of owners, which is 
against the principle of maximisation of shareholders’ wealth (Jansen and Meckling, 
1976). The board of directors is an instrument through which shareholders can exert 
influence on the behaviour of managers to ensure that a firm is operated in their interests. 
A board is composed of inside directors who are members of the management term, 
outside directors who do not have direct interests within the firm. Board directors might 
come from diverse backgrounds of different genders, races, cultures, ages and etc. The 
board may be less influential when the board’s composition or board activities are 
inappropriate. Thus, what sort of board composition and activities can effectively monitor 
managers and therefore leads to firm good performance is always a research focus.  
Another feature of modern companies is the relationship between the shareholders. 
Share ownership allows for the establishment and operation of a firm with huge amounts 
of capital gathered from massive sources. Investors are eligible to invest money into 
firms that will provide them with expected returns. However, large shareholders may end 
up in control, forcing the firm to take actions that benefit themselves at the expense of the 
minority shareholders. Resources could be transferred to parent companies or to the 
accounts of other related parties. Nevertheless, in situations without controlling 
shareholders, dispersed investors may lack the incentive to monitor firms, giving the 
 4 
managers a “free ride”. It is argued that if large shareholders with sufficiently large stakes 
will be in line with the interests of the firm, in other words, large shareholders would 
have no incentive to expropriate the minority shareholders, and would engage in the 
monitoring the firm. Thus, the optimum level and nature of ownership concentration for 
firm value is another research focus.  
An increasing number of papers have been published on the impact of board 
composition on firm performance/value. One important characteristics of board 
composition is board size which is represented by the number of directors. Jensen (1993) 
argued that large corporate boards are less effective in making decisions. CEOs find it 
easier to persuade directors of large boards to follow their intentions. Yermack (1996) 
raises evidence in support of Jensen’s argument. He states that companies with small 
boards exhibit a superior financial ratio, and provide strong performance incentives for 
CEOs through compensation and the threat of dismissal. Alternatively, board size 
increases according to company performance as troubled firms are more likely to add 
directors to increase their monitoring capacity. However, Linck et al (2008) provides 
evidence that smaller boards are not necessarily better than larger boards.  
It is argued that inside directors dominate boards. Fama and Jensen (1983) point out 
that outside directors exhibit more independence from the CEO. A board with a great 
presence of outside directors may administrate to safeguard the interests of shareholders. 
However, outsiders are less informed about firm projects. Inside managers are an 
important source of firm-specific information, and their inclusion on boards can lead to 
more effective decision marking. Klein (1998) finds a positive relationship between the 
percentage of inside directors and firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and 
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Yermack (1996) deny this relationship. Dahya and McConnell (2005) conclude that 
boards with a greater proportion of outside directors make better decisions particularly on 
the appointment of CEOs. Chen et al (2006) provide evidence from Chinese cases that 
firms having a high proportion of outside directors on the board are less likely to engage 
in fraud.  
The contribution of board diversity to firm performance also attracts plenty of 
studies. Carter et al (2003) states that diversity increases board independence because 
people with different genders and ethnic or cultural backgrounds tend to ask questions 
that would not come from directors with more traditional backgrounds. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (2001) and Carter et al. (2003) document significant positive relationships 
between firm value and the fraction of women and minorities on boards. Erhardt et al. 
(2003) indicate that if women are seen to be adding new perspectives, then they would 
become more prevalent on boards, and be associated with good firm performance. 
Alternatively, if the inclusion of women on the boards is merely “window dressing” for 
the public, the presence of women may actually decrease the firm value.   
A lot of criticism has been put forward regarding the dual appointment of board 
chairmen and firm CEOs. Duality is seen to give too much power to the individual and 
therefore reduces the checks and balances in top management (Jensen, 1993). This can 
make it easier to abuse power and engage in activities that are not in the best interests of 
shareholders. Bai et al (2004) find that duality reduced the firm value for Chinese listed 
firms. However, an alternative view argues that separating the roles of chairman and 
CEO in the case of Chinese listed firms created a paralysis whether the two positions did 
not agree on decisions or strategies (Chen et al, 2006).  
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The primary responsibility of the board of directors is to engage, monitor and 
replace company management where necessary. The decisions and information 
announcements are usually made at either board meetings or general shareholder 
meetings. Thus, the initiative and activities of the board can be observed from the 
frequency of board meetings and general shareholder meetings. Vafeas (1999) finds that 
frequent board meetings tend to follow poor performance, and herald improvements in 
profitability. Chen et al (2006) find board meeting frequency is positively associated with 
fraud for Chinese listed firms. This might imply that a firm’s questionable or illegal 
activities were actually discussed by the board over a number of meetings.  
Research on the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance is broadly 
published. Berle and Means (1932) suggest that a negative link can be observed between 
ownership dispersion and firm performance. Concentrated ownership provides the large 
investors with both sufficient incentive and power to discipline management, and thus 
improve firm performance by decreasing monitoring costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 
and 1996). Demsetz and Lehn (1985) document a linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and ex-post firm performance measures. This similarly linear relationship 
is also found on the Chinese market (Xu and Wang, 1999; Chen and Gong, 2000; Gul 
and Zhao, 2000) and Czech market (Claessens et al, 1 996 and 1997).  
However, research also suggests a nonlinear relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance. Increasing ownership 
concentration from a low level develops the incentive and power for large 
shareholders to monitor management. However, a further increase in ownership 
concentration may create controlling ambition and capability for large 
 7 
shareholders to manipulate the firm and expropriate minority shareholders. 
When the ownership concentration approaches one hundred percent, the 
interests of controlling shareholders and the firms become aligned and the 
incentive of tunnelling is removed. With this type of explanation, Morck et al 
(1988) find a U shape firm value relationship to ownership concentration on the 
U.S. market. Tian (2002) makes a similar argument, finding this U-shaped relationship 
in Chinese firms. 
There is also evidence that ownership concentration has no relationship with or in 
fact reduces firm value. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) assert that they find no relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance for U.S. firms. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) affirm this viewpoint by showing this relationship to be insignificant. 
Leech and leahy (1991) analyse U.K. firms by using several measures of ownership 
concentration. They display a negative and significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value and profitability. Mudambi and Niclosia (1998) confirm this 
observation as well.      
Another group of research examines the impact of specific ownership 
concentration on firm performance. Holderness et al (1999) document that low 
levels of managerial ownership increases firm value, but at higher levels 
decreases firm value. McConnell and Servaes (1990) conduct research into the 
consideration of institutional ownership. They find that a positive relationship is 
observable between ownership concentration of non-banking financial 
institutions and the performance of those institutions. Xu and Wang (1999) and 
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Qi et al (2000) find that the performance of China’s listed firms is negatively 
related to state ownership but positively related to legal person ownership.  
China’s economic reforms began in 1978, shifting from a centrally-
controlled economy to a more market-oriented economy with the aim of 
increasing efficiency. Since the establishment of stock markets in 1990 until April 
2008, about 1552 companies have become listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchange. Explicitly, firm administration is being structured 
similar to those of western countries’1. The board of directors is the headquarter 
of the firm, which represents the shareholders in making important decisions, 
such as appointment of the management team including the CEO, authorisation 
of compensation and dividend policies, and review and suggestion of operating 
strategy. The board is lead by the Chairman and comprised of inside directors 
and independent/outside directors. The listed firms represent the separation of 
management and ownership, where a number of shareholders own various 
stakes of shares.           
However, Chinese firms have many implicit special features. First, many listed 
firms are reformed state enterprises. The boards and management teams tend to 
be filled with the original state enterprises’ senior staff or imbued with relevant 
government offices. Secondly, China is still on the way to approaching a more 
market-oriented economy. The goal of shareholder wealth maximization is 
frequently dominated by politics. Not only the politic policy is a key concern in 
                                                 
1
 Xu and Wang (1999) argue that China’s firms likely adopt European Continental (German) – Japanese 
model that ownership is highly concentred.   
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the firm operation, but also the members of political party may posit important 
positions in board or management teams 2 . Thirdly, as regards market 
capitalisation, state shares account for 34.20%, legal person shares account for 
13.40%, managerial and employment shares are 3.13%. Since these shares are 
non-tradable, only 49.27% shares are floating on the market3.  
The unique features of Chinese listed firms have attracted research 
attention. Scholars intend to explain the relationship between corporate 
governance, ownership structure and firm performance of China’s listing firms. 
For example, Chang and Wong (2003) investigate the relationship between managerial 
discretion and firm performance.  Kato and Long (2005) examine the impact of CEO 
turnover on firm performance. Fan et al 2007) study the efficiency enhancement of 
politically-connected CEOs. Chen et al (2006) conduct research including into the 
engagement of executive and non-executive directors in fraud. Li and Wu (2002) and Sun 
and Tong (2003) investigate the impact of state-ownership on enterprise performance. 
Sun and Tong (2003) test the impact of share issuance privatization and legal person 
shares on firm performance.  
The novelty of this research is firstly to provide parallel tests on relationships 
between board composition, board activities, ownership concentration and firm 
performance respectively. It then accordingly gives a comprehensive analysis on the 
impact of board composition, board activities, ownership concentration on firm value. 
The interactive effect of different ownership concentrations and endogenous problems are 
                                                 
2
 Fan et al (2007) have a research on the involvement of government bureaucrats and politic organisation in 
the corporate governance of China’s listing firms.    
3
 The percentages of ownership are calculated using the data 2003 and 2004, the sample period of this 
research.  
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logically accounted for. We have the following findings in this paper including: 1) board 
size and board diversity have no observable influence on firm value; 2) the addition of 
independent directors on the boards enhances firm value; 3) board’s activities as 
represented by the frequency of board meetings and general shareholder meetings are 
associated with negative and positive firm performance respectively; 4) the tradable share 
ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value; 5) 
companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership 
concentrations have a greater firm value than companies with only a single highest level 
of ownership concentration. These companies are also found to have greater firm value 
than companies with the highest levels of both total share and state ownership 
concentration.       
The rest of this paper is structured as follow: Section 2 describes the data and 
defines the variables; Section 3 interprets basic statistics and conducts Variance Analysis 
(ANOVA); Section 4 applies regression analysis using OLS modelling; Section 5 deals 
with endogenous problems using logit and 2SLS methods. Section 6 concludes this 
research.  
 
2. Data and variables 
 
Our research focuses on firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 
2003 and 2004. This covers accounting information, the holding stakes of large 
shareholders, and daily share prices from 2003 to 2004, during which time the regulatory 
framework was relatively more stable and consistent than other periods. The 2002 Code 
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of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies issued by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission and State Economic and Trade Commission was very important 
legislation in order to improve its corporate governance policies to prepare Chinese 
companies for foreign competitors after China’s entry into the WTO at the end of 2001. 
In 2005, China started to implement new Split Share Structure Reforms through which 
some non-tradable shares were floated by disposing a portion of the state’s shares.  This 
policy has changed the ownership structure of the listed firms to some extent, which led 
to some changes in the information collected. For this reason we do not seek to extend 
our analysis beyond 2005. 
 
We exclude some types of firms from our sample. These include financial firms 
which are specially regulated and usually have extremely high leverage ratios compared 
to other firms. We have also excluded firms classified by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) as “special treatment” (ST) or “particular transfer” (PT) firms. The 
ST and PT firms are specially monitored due to their poor operation and restrictions have 
been imposed on the trading of their shares as well
4
. The third type of firms excluded is 
those with foreign ownership, such as the firms which issue B-shares on the domestic 
market and H-shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Firms with foreign ownership 
are subject to different requirements for listing, reporting and even a different accounting 
standard. We will include firms with foreign ownership in our future studies. The last 
                                                 
4
 In order to enhance the listing firm governance and protection to investors’ interests, the CSRC 
introduced a special delisting mechanism in 1998.  Under the guidelines set forth by the CSRC, a firm that 
has negative profits for two consecutive years will be designated a ST firm. If a ST firm continues to suffer 
loss for one more year, it will be designated a PT firm. A PT firm will be delisted if it cannot turn profitable 
within another one year.  The shares of ST firms are traded with a 5% price change limit each day versus 
10% for normal firms’ shares. The midterm reports must be audited. The shares of PT firms can only be 
traded on Friday, with a maximum 5% upside limit to last Friday’s closing price, but no limit on the 
downside (Bai et al 2002).  
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category of firms excluded includes those firms with data missing or incomplete 
information for our modelling. Therefore, we retain the 1975 set of observations of firms. 
Our data was mainly obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR) created by GTA Information Technology Company and The 
University of Hong Kong. We have made a number of corrections on the data with 
references from several other data sources.  
We have structured the variables into several categories for our analysis. Firm 
performance (value) variable is the return on asset. Board composition variables include 
the number of directors, number of independent directors, dual position of CEO-chairman 
dummy variables, average age of directors, number of female directors, female CEO 
dummy variables and female chairman dummy variables. Board activity variables include 
the number of board meetings, the number of general shareholder meetings and the ratio 
of share ownership representation. Ownership and ownership concentration variables 
consist of the ratio of state ownership, the ratio of total share ownership concentration 
and the ratio of tradable shares tradable share ownership concentration. The ownership 
size control variables include the total number of shares outstanding and the total number 
of shareholders. The industry control variables include utility, manufacture, commercial, 
and conglomerate. To avoid the dummy variable trap, we omit dummies for the 
remaining industries such as property. Their effects are captured by the intercept.  
The most widely used firm performance measures in financial literature are Tobin-
Q, return on equity, return on sale, return on asset and etc. Tobin-Q is argued to have the 
advantage of reflecting the firm’s current value and future profitability potential. 
However, in the extremely speculative and emerging market of China, share prices are 
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manipulated. We find many cases in which firms with a negative net profit have larger 
Tobin-Q than firms with a positive net profit. In particular, a large proportion of 
outstanding shares are non-tradable. Using the market price of tradable shares to calculate 
the market value of non-tradable shares would overvalue the firms. Return on equity 
seems an appropriate measure of investment profitability. But return on equity is useless 
for the firms which have negative equity or both negative profit and equity, which is not 
exceptional amongst Chinese firms. Return on sale is immune to the problems incurred in 
Tobin-Q and return on equity. Unfortunately, reliable sale data was not available. Sale 
value is always characterised as having less comparability among different industries. 
Therefore, we utilise the return on asset as the firm performance measure in consideration 
of the comparative merits. The return on asset is defined as the annual net profit divided 
by the average book value of assets at the beginning and end of year (Return_asset). 
Actually, we also used a second return on asset that is defined as the annual net profit 
divided by book value of assets at the end of year. We have carried out a parallel analysis 
with the two measures of firm value throughout this paper. As the results are almost 
identical, we will only report the analysis using the first return on asset to save printing 
space.                     
With respect to the board composition variables, the number of directors (Num_dir) 
is the total number of directors on a board. Large board size is associated with sufficient 
capacity to monitor the company. Large boards are also associated with lower efficiency 
due to the time consumed in reaching agreements. Yermack (1996) finds there is a 
negative relationship between board size and firm performance. Cheng (2008) documents 
that large boards increase the stability of firm performance. We will try to find out if the 
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effect of board size varies in a Chinese setting. Independent directors are defined as those 
who have no position in the management team and no direct business or benefit links 
within the firm. Thus, they are proposed as pure representatives of the shareholders with 
no hesitance in monitoring the firms. We forecast that increasing the number of 
independent directors on a board (Num_indir) is a positive driver of firm value for firms 
dominated by inside ownership
5
. We created a dummy variable (Ceo_chair) that equals 1 
if the chairman of the board of directors is also the CEO of a firm and 0 otherwise. The 
duality of CEO-chairman may either improve the decision making speed of the CEO or 
reduce the monitoring responsibility of the chairman. We suspect that on average the 
duality of CEO-chairman has negative effects on firm value (Bai et al, 2004).  
The average age of directors (Age_dir) reflects the monitoring experience of board. 
Experienced board should increase the firm’s value provided that the directors are not 
“too old” and reluctant to admit new technologies and markets. In line with this 
conjecture, we expect that the average age of board members is positively related to firm 
value. Board diversity is defined as the presence and percentage of women, African 
American, Asians and Hispanics in a board of directors (Carter, 2003). Carter (2003) 
finds that diversity increases board independence because people with different genders, 
ethnic, or cultural background tend to ask questions that would not come from directors 
                                                 
5
 It was difficult to classify inside and outside directors for China’s listed firms. As many listing firms were 
transferred from state enterprises or other legal entities, State and legal person ownership account for more 
than fifty percent. The members of board used to be the prior staff of the state enterprises and legal 
entities and nominated by the parent companies or government authorities. They normally 
received salary from the listed firms and involved in routine firm management. To regulate the 
board activities and protect the interests of minority shareholders, the CSRC issue the guidelines to 
introduce independent directors in 2001. An independent is not employed by the firm, does not supply 
service to the firm, or more generally does not have a conflict to interest in the accomplishment of her 
oversight mission. Actually, the independent directors in China’s listed firms can be thought as outside 
directors that are defined in the literature (Kato and Long 2005).  
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with more traditional backgrounds (Carter, 2003). We apply three variables to define 
board diversity. One is a female chairman dummy (F_chair) that equals 1 for female 
chairman and 0 otherwise. The other is the number of female directors (Num_fdir) in a 
board. In addition we also set a female CEO dummy (F_CEO) which is 1 for a CEO 
being a female and 0 otherwise. We predict that board diversity will have a positive effect 
on firm value.      
Regarding the board’s activities, we apply three measures. The board of directors 
has the responsibility to appoint and remove the CEO and senior management team, 
determine the system of internal management and undertake other necessary decisions. 
The number of board meetings per year (Dir_mting) represents the depth of board 
involvement in monitoring. A proper frequency of board meetings enhances the vigilance 
and oversight of firm management and adds to firm value. Alternatively, overloading 
board meetings may discourage the initiative of managers or increase the times 
controversial decisions are made that may involve illegal or questionable activities. 
Vafeas (1999) finds that frequent board meetings following poor performance can herald 
improvements in profitability. Chen et al (2006) find that board meeting frequency is 
positively associated with fraud in China and decreases firm value. We forecast that the 
frequency of board meetings is negative correlated with firm value.  
The general shareholder meeting is the venue of super decision making. The 
appointments of CEO and chairman, dividend polices, investment proposals and financial 
schemes need to be discussed and approved in the general meetings. The more frequent 
the general shareholder meetings, the more chances that shareholders will invigilate with 
both the management team and the board of directors. Also, a board with confidence in 
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their decision proposals will likely hold more frequent general shareholder meetings. 
Boards that believe their proposals will be accepted generally treat their meeting as a 
superb opportunity to broadcast their monitoring ability. Thus, we expect that the 
frequency of general shareholder meetings per year (Holder_mting) increases firm value. 
The ratio of ownership representation involves the shares owned by the shareholders who 
are present in general meeting to the total shares outstanding (Ratio_rep). It reflects the 
enthusiasm of shareholders in monitoring firms and the intention of holding the shares. 
Confident boards of directors always encourage the participation of shareholders at 
general meetings. In turn, the high ratio of ownership representation enhances the efforts 
of the board and management team and adds to firm value. 
With regards to ownership concentration, the first variable is the total share 
ownership concentration, which is the ratio of shares held by the top ten (total)
6
 
shareholders to the total shares outstanding (Top10_total). Morck et al (1988) and Bai et 
al (2004) state that increasing the ownership concentration from a low level lessens the 
free-ride problem. However, further increases may provide large shareholders with the 
possibility to expropriate small shareholders’ wealth. When ownership concentration 
approaches one-hundred percent, the interests of large shareholders align with the firm 
completely and the incentive of expropriation disappears. Thus, the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm value displays a U-shape. We find that the top ten total 
shareholders own 61.55% (or weighted average 56.78%) of total shares outstanding. 
Among the top ten total shareholders, 53.85% of them are non-tradable shareholders with 
a ratio of their non-tradable shares to their total shares being 91.97%. This means that 
                                                 
6
 In the context, we will use “top ten total shareholders” to replace “top ten shareholders” to make an 
explicit difference from “top ten tradable shareholders”.  
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about six of the top ten total shareholders (53.85%) hold about 56.61% (i.e.: 61.55% of 
the 91.97%) shares on the market and their shares are non-tradable. Since they cannot sell 
the shares even they forecast the share price going to be unfavourable, while the possible 
incentive of tunnelling is alleviative, they also have intention of propping when the firm 
confronting with financial problems
7
. Therefore, we expect an asymmetric U(V) shape 
with a high right hand side.  
The second variable is the tradable share ownership concentration, which is the 
ratio of tradable shares held by the top ten tradable shareholders to the total tradable 
shares (Top10_trade). As the total tradable shares are only 33.50% of total shares 
outstanding and the top ten tradable shareholders hold 9.83% of the total tradable shares 
on average, the top tradable shareholders seldom have the dominating power to 
expropriate the other shareholders. They either pay attention to monitoring firms or sell 
the shares to become smaller shareholders. Hence, we expect a positive relationship 
between firm value and ownership concentration measured by the ratio of the top ten 
tradable shares.  
Our third variable is the concentration of state ownership, which is the ratio of 
state-owned shares to the total shares outstanding (Ratio_state). As many share-
ownership firms were reformed from state-owned enterprises, the state retains about 
32.52% (or weighted average 42.58% of shares) on average. On the one hand, state-
owned shares represent managerial bureaucracy and inefficiency. Increasing state 
ownership decreases firm value. On the other hand, the state always retains a large share 
                                                 
7
 Actually, the non-tradable shares can be sold by negotiation between the legal persons. However, the 
transaction of non-tradable shares needs to be approved by the authority. Trading of non-tradable shares is 
for the restructure of ownership instead of making profit. The prices applied subject to negotiation and are 
significantly lower than the market price.   
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stake in firms that occupy the broad market and have high profitability. The state also 
supports firms with favourable policies in tax, capital and product materials. Therefore, 
we imply a flat U-shape for the association between the ratio of state-owned shares and 
firm value.      
With the control variables necessarily employed in the regression analyses, we 
include the total number of shares outstanding (Total_share) and total number of 
shareholders (Total_holder) to control ownership size effect. Ownership size influences 
the ownership concentration. For a given number of shares outstanding, large number of 
shareholders tends to lower ownership concentration. For a given number of shareholders, 
large number of shares tends to increase ownership concentration. Another point of view 
is that large number of shares outstanding tends not to foster dominating shareholders. 
We also apply industry control variables such as the firm characteristics of corporate 
governance, capital structure, ownership attributes and profitability which vary in terms 
of industries. The industry control variables that follow comprehensive classifications 
and are most popularly used in China include utility, manufacture, commerce, 
conglomerate, financial and property. In the regression, we adopt four dummy variables 
for utility (Util_indtry), manufacture (Manu_indtry), commerce (Comm_indry) and 
conglomeration (Cong_indry). The property (Prop_indry) will be carried in the intercept 
to avoid the dummy variable trap.    
 
3. Univariate interpretation and ANOVA (Analysis of Variance)  
3.1. Univariate interpretation 
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The statistics of designated variables are reported in Table 1. The return on asset 
(Return_assets1) is 0.0247 on average. The return on asset varies a lot with a minimum of 
-0.6121 and a maximum of 0.3138. The mode is 0.0011, far from the mean and median to 
right side, which means that more firms experienced lower returns than the average.  
- Insert Table 1 here - 
The number of director seems to be more or less even across the firms with a mean 
of 9.79 and median and mode of 9. The largest board has 21 directors, and the smallest 
have only five directors. The range of this variable seems to conform to Chinese 
Company Law that stipulates joint stock companies require five to nineteen directors. 
The number of independent directors ranges from 1 to 7 with similar mean 3.25, median 
3 and mode 3 respectively. It is generally cited that CSRC stipulates that there should be 
at least two independent members on each listed firm’s board of directors by June 30, 
2002, and independent directors should further constitute at least one third of the total 
number of directors by June 20, 2003 (Kato and Long 2005). However, our dataset shows 
that the guideline regarding independent directors has not been well implemented. 
The ages of directors are symmetrically distributed with the mean, median and 
mode around 48 years. In particular, the standard deviation of ages is comparatively 
smaller than the mean. The duality of CEO-chairman is not prevalent. The mean of 
0.0946 implies that only 9.46% of chairmen concurrently possess the position of CEO. 
The boards are not widely diversified with little involvement of female directors. For 
instance, only 3.49% chairmen and 3.34% CEOs are female. The number of female 
directors approaches just one (0.9317) on average in each board.  
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Normally, the board of directors holds meetings about 7 times a year. But some 
boards hold meetings more frequently up to 32 times a year. The general shareholder 
meeting is held twice a year on average, at least once and at most seven per year. On 
average, the ownership of shareholders participating in the meetings represents 57.79% 
of total shares outstanding. However, representatives account for only 10.23% in some 
cases compared to 100% in extreme cases.             
The ownership of Chinese firms is excessively concentrated. The top ten total 
shareholders own 61.55% total shares outstanding on average, with a maximum of 
89.77%. Thus, the top ten total shareholders are able to control the firms and dominate 
other shareholders. The top ten tradable shareholders own 8.47% tradeable shares on 
average, with an extreme case of 77.77%. The top ten tradable shareholders may have the 
capacity to influence market prices. The average ratio of state-owned shares is 34.20% of 
total shares outstanding (It is 42.58% with value weighted average. If we take into 
account indirect state ownership, such as shares owned by legal persons whose parent 
companies are state enterprises, average state ownership would be about 51.21%). The 
state is always the largest shareholder for many firms in China. However, there are also 
some firms free of state ownership or direct state ownership.      
The ownership size varies greatly across firms. The minimum number of total 
shares outstanding is 50.50 millions and the maximum is 125,120 millions with a mean of 
457.30 millions. The minimum number of shareholders is 2.04 thousand and the 
maximum is 728.76 thousand with an average of 46.86 thousand. The number of share 
and shareholders in the largest company is 2778, which is 357.24 times larger than the 
number in the smallest company. In the sample, manufacturing is the largest industry 
 21 
with 65.18% of total firms, while the property was the smallest industry accounting for 
only 5.06% of the total number of firms. Outside the sample, the nine financial firms 
accounted for only 0.91% of firms on the market.         
 
3.2 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) 
 
The impact of board composition on the firm value 
The basic characteristics of board composition have been interpreted in the last 
subsection. Now we investigate the impact of board composition on firm value. The 
results of ANOVA are arranged in Table 2. In Panel 1, we classify the firms into three 
groups in terms of the distribution of the number of directors: 1) the firms with a board 
comprising less than 9 directors; 2) firms comprising 9 to 10 directors (around the mean, 
median and mode); and 3) firms comprising more than 9 directors. The results show that 
firm value increases as the number of directors grows, but only insignificantly. Our 
results seem to be inconsistent with Yermack’s (1996) evidence. He finds an inverse and 
significant association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. 
industrial corporations between 1984 and 1989, using Tobin’s Q as an approximation of 
market valuation.  
- insert Table 2 here- 
We also divide the firms into three groups in terms of the distribution of the number 
of independent directors: 1) firms with a board consisting of less than three independent 
directors; 2) firms consisting of three independent directors (the median and mode); and 3) 
firms consisting of more than three independent directors. Panel 2 displays a significant 
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and positive relationship between the number of independent directors and firm value. 
The mean values for return on asset are 0.0092, 0.0251 and 0.0306 for firms with less 
than 3, equal to 3 and larger than 3 independent directors respectively. We have indicated 
previously that independent directors of China’s firms actually represent outside directors. 
The effect of outside directors on firm value is uncertain in the literature. For example, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that outside directors are more effective in 
safeguarding the interests of shareholders. However, they are less informed and thence 
less effective in decision making. Klein (1998) finds a negative relationship between the 
percentage of outside directors and firm performance. Dahya and McConnell (2005) 
conclude that boards with a greater proportion of outside directors make better decisions 
and generate firm good performance. We argue that independent directors may have not 
too much chance to carry out their duty in a mature and well invigilated market. In 
contrast, they may be more active in protecting shareholder interests in an immature and 
not well regulated market. The function of independent directors is more apparent when 
initially introduced into the inside directors dominated boards. The latter is suitable to 
explain the new emerging market of China.  
To test whether the elder directors represent the administrative experience of boards 
and add to firm value, we sort the boards with the average ages of board members less 
than 45 years’ old, 45 to 50 years’ old (around the mean, median and mode) and more 
than 50 years’ old respectively. Panel 3 shows that the elder boards are indeed 
accompanied with high firm values, which was our expectation. For example, the “eldest 
board” with an average age over 50 had a return on asset of 0.0348, while the “youngest 
board” with an average age under 45 had a return on asset of 0.0147. The former is over 
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double the latter. Panel 5 shows the firm value represented by return on asset for the 
firms with the duality of CEO-chairman and for the firms with the separation of CEO and 
chairman respectively. The difference of the mean returns is minimal and insignificant. 
The dual position of CEO and board chairman does not seems to matter for firm 
performance in China.  
Now we turn to test board diversity and firm performance. Panel 5 shows the firm 
values for firms with a female chairman and firms with a male chairman. Panel 6 shows 
the firm values for firms with a female CEO and firms with a male CEO. Panel 7 shows 
the firm value for firms that have female directors present on their boards and firms 
without. The F-tests imply that neither a female chairman nor female CEO have a 
significant influence on firm value. Only the boards with general female directors have a 
marginal association with low firm values. The findings are beyond our expectations and 
against the evidence put forward by Carter et al. (2003) and Farrell and Hersch (2005). 
They document that board diversity with female directors adds to firm value. We argue 
that if a board includes a member in consideration of share owners’ interests, the firm 
value will be expected to increase. If a board includes a member merely for he sake of 
“window dressing” or for “diversity, multicultural and democracy”, the selection might 
not be based on their skills and abilities and thus firm value may be negatively influenced. 
Thus, we suspect, in China, female chairmen and CEOs are appointed in terms of 
management priority, while some general female directors are merely nominated for the 
sake of “window dressing”.    
 
The impact of board activities on firm value 
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The ANOVA on the impact of board activities on firm value is arranged in Table 3. 
In relation to the frequency of board meetings, firms are grouped under three categories: 
less than 7, 7 to 9 (including mean and median), and more than 9 board meetings. Panel 1 
shows that the return on asset declines significantly from firms with a low frequency of 
board meetings to firms with a high frequency of board meetings. Frequent board 
meetings might imply either the inefficiency of the board in making decisions leading to 
low firm performance, or the board endeavour to deal with existing problems (Vafeas 
1999).   
- insert Table 3 here - 
We also classify firms with frequencies of general shareholder meetings of less 
than 2, being 2 (mean, mode and median), and more than 2. Panel 2 shows that the return 
on asset is higher for firms with more general shareholder meetings than firms with fewer 
general shareholder meetings. The significance is 5%, represented by F-statistics. The 
general shareholder meetings either enhance the invigilation of shareholders in the firm’s 
management, thereby improving firm value, or allow highly performed firms to broadcast 
their achievements.      
In Panel 3, firms are sorted in terms of ratios of ownership representative in general 
shareholder meetings, the ratio less than 50%, between 50% and 60% (including mean, 
median and mode), larger than 60%. We find that high ratios of ownership representation 
usually accompany good firm performance. High ratios of ownership representation 
mean that either the sound depth of shareholders’ involvement in monitoring firm 
management, or the willingness that shareholders attend the general meetings of high 
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performed firms. Overall, the impact of board activities on firm value is as we anticipated 
previously.         
 
The impact of ownership concentration on the firm value 
We have already designed three variables for the proxy of ownership concentration. 
The top ten total share ratio represents total share ownership concentration. To 
investigate the influence of ownership concentration on firm value, we sorted the firms in 
terms of the quintuple of the top ten total share ratios ascendingly. Panel 1 in Table 4 
shows firm values within every quintuple. The firm value initially decreases and reaches 
a trough in the second quintuple. Thereafter, the firm value increases in the third 
quintuple and is retained in the fourth quintuple, and finally reaches a peak in the fifth 
quintuple. Firm values display an asymmetric U (or V) shape in line with the total share 
ownership concentration, which is as we expected. The increase of ownership 
concentration from low levels lessens the free-ride problem. A further increase may 
foster large shareholders with the power to expropriate the minority shareholders. When 
the ownership converges sufficiently, the interests of large shareholders align properly 
with the firm and the incentive of expropriation will fade away (Morck et al, 1988; Bai et 
al, 2004). Since large shareholders retain a large proportion of non-tradable shares, their 
interests may align with the firm more quickly.  
- insert Table 4 here - 
The top ten tradable share ratios represent tradable share ownership concentration. 
We also sorted firms in terms of the quintuple of the top ten tradable share ratios 
ascendingly. Panel 2 shows that the firm value grows substantially and consistently along 
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with the increase of tradable share ownership concentration, which represents a linear 
relationship that is as we anticipated. Tradable shares in China account for 33.5% of total 
shares outstanding and the top ten tradable shareholders possess about 10% of total 
tradable shares. The large tradable shareholders have no power to expropriate other 
shareholders. Instead, they not only engage in monitoring the firm by sending questions 
and suggestions, they but also may change their positions by selling the shares if the 
firms run out of their expectation. Share selling is the reaction to bad management and an 
enhancement of shareholder alertness. Therefore, the increase of tradable share 
ownership concentration will continue to add to firm value.    
The ratio of state ownership is the shares directly owned by the state to the total 
shares outstanding. We group firms into no state ownership, state ownership less than 
50% and state ownership over 50%. We find from Panel 3, that the firm values are 
significantly different between firms with various levels of state ownership. Firms with 
some state ownership but less than 50% underperform against other firms. Clearly, it is a 
U (or V) shaped relationship between the ratio of state shares and firm value, which is 
consistent with our previous discussion. State ownership represents inefficiency in 
management. When the state ownership increases from a low level, firms tend to 
underperform on the average market. However, a large firm with a high proportion of 
state ownership is usually protected by the government with special policies regarding tax 
consideration, capital financing and industry monopoly.  
 
The interactive effects of ownership concentration on firm value 
 27 
We suspect that the different categories of ownership concentration may have 
interactive effects on firm value. For example, many listed firms in China were 
transferred from state enterprises. The state usually retains a bulk of the shares of these 
firms. However, over recent years, some firms that have experienced no state ownership 
(or direct state ownership) were listed on the market as well (see Panel 3 in Table 4). 
Therefore, we are going to see whether or not the impact of total share ownership 
concentration on firm value varies in terms of the levels of state ownership concentration.  
The results of an interactive ANOVA between state share and total share ownership 
concentration are arranged in Panel 1 of Table 5. The rows represent firms according to 
their level of state ownership and the columns represent firms classified by the quintuple 
of total share ownership concentration. The data in each intersection of the matrix are 
mean returns on assets and other relevant information. From the rows, we observe that 
when there is no state ownership or the state ownership is less than 50%, firm values 
display an asymmetric U(V) shape as the total share ownership concentration enlarges. 
However, when state ownership is over 50%, the asymmetric U(V) shape of firm values 
varies. In particular, in the first quintuple of total share ownership concentration the mean 
return on asset is minimal with a negative of -0.0168. In the fifth quintuple of total share 
ownership concentration, the mean return on asset is the greatest with a value of 0.0624. 
Another possible explanation is that when state ownership dominates a firm but is held by 
relatively dispersed representatives
8
, the firm has serious free-ride problems and incurs a 
lower firm value. In contrast, when the dominant state ownership is held by a relatively 
concentrated number of representatives, the free-ride problem is mitigated to some extent 
                                                 
8
 The state shares of a firm can be held by state government (Bureau of State Asset Administration), 
provincial government, local government and different legal entities that are currently or previously state 
enterprises.   
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which leads to a higher firm value. The expropriation of minority shareholders may not 
be a problem when firms are dominated by a concentrated state ownership. We also find 
that 0.0624 is the largest return on asset in Panel 1 and achieved by companies with the 
highest levels of ownership concentration of both state shares and total shares, which is 
greater than the 0.0553 and 0.0354 obtained by companies with a single highest level in 
either state ownership concentration or total share ownership concentration respectively.  
- insert Table 5 here - 
We conducted another interactive ANOVA between total share ownership and 
tradable share ownership concentration. In Panel 2 of Table 5, the rows are the quintuple 
of total share ownership concentration and the columns are the quintuple of tradable 
share ownership concentration. From the rows, we find that on any level the total share 
ownership concentration firm values increase as the tradable share ownership 
concentration goes up. The change of total share ownership concentration does not alter 
the liner relationship between tradable share ownership and firm values. Even the 
tradable shares account for only a small proportion of the total outstanding shares, the 
tradable shareholders are genuine watchdogs of the firms. They monitor the firms while 
having no intention or power to manipulate firms in their own interest that is against firm 
values. Thus, floating non-tradable shares would be a strategy to improving firms and the 
performance of the entire market.  
By observing Panel 2, we find that firm values have an increasing trend from the 
top-left corner to the bottom-right corner, which appears as a diagonal line. The 
minimum mean return on asset of -0.0035 appears on the intersection of the lowest levels 
of total share and tradable share ownership concentration, while the maximum return on 
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asset of 0.0794 exists on the intersection of the highest levels of total share and tradable 
share ownership concentration. Interestingly, companies with the lowest levels of both 
total share and tradable ownership concentration have a smaller firm value (the mean 
return of -0.0035) than companies with only a single lowest level of ether total share 
(0.0136) or tradable share (0.0024) concentration. In contrast, companies with the highest 
levels of both total and tradable share ownership concentration (0.0794) have a greater 
firm value than companies with only a single highest level of either total share (0.0553) 
or tradable share ownership concentration (0.0583). These companies also have a greater 
firm value than companies with the highest levels of both total share and state ownership 
concentration in Panel 1.  
 
4. Multivariate analysis   
The separate impacts of individual variables on firm performance have been 
analysed. Now we pool those variables in the OLS model to test the impact of an 
individual variable under the condition of other variable effects.  
' ' ' '
j j k k l l m mV W X Y Z eα β η γ ϕ= + + + + +  (1) 
Where V is a variable of firm value/performance, W is a vector of board 
composition variables, X is a vector of board activity variables, Y is a vector of ownership 
concentration variables, Z is a vector of other control variables, α is intercept, e is the 
error term, β, η, γ, and φ are the vectors of coefficients. j, k, l, m represent the dimensions 
of related vectors. The individual variables in each vector have been initially interpreted 
in section 2 and listed in Table 1. However, we transposed some variables for the 
specified application in the model. First, we employed the form of a logarithm for some 
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variables to avoid the influence of their observations being asymmetrically distributed. 
Secondly, we adopted the ratio of independent directors to total directors (Ratio_indir) to 
avoid the effects of multicollinearity between the numbers of directors and independent 
directors. Thirdly, for the same reason as the second, we changed the number of female 
directors into a dummy variable, i.e., if a board includes female directors. Finally, we 
added quadratic terms for the state share ratio (Ratio_state2) and the top ten total share 
ratio (Top10_total2) respectively to absorb the possible nonlinear relationship of these 
two variables with firm value.   
Table 6 reports the results generated from this model. Most of the results are 
consistent with evidence obtained in ANOVA analyses. Regarding board composition, 
the number of directors has a positive and insignificant coefficient, which means that 
increasing board size provides more oversight capacity for some firms to promote the 
firm value, but not effectively for all firms. The coefficient of the ratio of independent 
directors is positive and significant at a 1% level. Independent directors seem to carry out 
their responsibility well in China. Additional independent directors promote firm value. 
The average age of directors has a significantly positive coefficient. Within a certain 
boundary, age represents experience that improves firm value. The duality of CEO and 
chairman, female chairman, female CEO and the presence of female directors in a board, 
is associated with very small and insignificant coefficients, and can be thought of as 
having no influence on firm value. However, the presence of female directors in a board 
is detected as a negative factor to the firm value in ANOVA analysis. The results in the 
regression analysis suggest that, taking other factors into consideration, the presence of 
female directors on a board does not affect firm value. 
 31 
- insert Table 6 here - 
Referring to board activities, the number of board meetings has a negative 
coefficient at a 1% significance. Frequent board meetings are associated with worse firm 
performance. As indicated previously, frequent board meetings reflect either inefficiency 
in board decision making or problems the firm needs to discuss in the board meetings. In 
contrast, the number of general shareholder meetings has a positive coefficient 
statistically at a 5% significant level. As discussed before, the general shareholder 
meetings provide monitoring opportunities for shareholders, which enhance firm 
performance. Also, the management team and board in confident and progressive firms 
treat the general shareholder meetings as an opportunity to disclosure good news. They 
prefer holding more general shareholder meetings if possible. The ratios of ownership 
representation in general shareholder meetings are positively related to the firm value at a 
1% level of significance. On the one hand, the more shareholders participating in the 
general shareholder meetings, the more likely there will be monitoring and suggestions 
being put forwarded. On the other hand, a confident and progressive firm is likely to 
attract more shareholders to participate in the meetings in that they advocate firm value. 
In relation to ownership concentration, the first power of the top ten total share ratio 
has a positive coefficient and the second power has a negative coefficient. This means the 
total share ownership concentration represented by the top ten total share ratio is 
nonlinear related to the firm performance. Less or more concentrated ownership is better 
for firm performance than moderate ownership concentration. Similarly it is the state 
ownership concentration represented by state share ratio. In addition, the coefficients of 
the first power and second power of the state share ratio are significantly positive and 
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negatively at a 5% level of significance. The state share ratio is more concave and is 
more related to the firm value than the top ten total share ratio. The tradable share 
ownership concentration, represented by the top ten tradeable share ratio, has a positive 
relation to firm performance at a 1% level of significance. Tradable shareholders have a 
strong incentive to monitor the firms and therefore improve firm value. The impacts of 
the three types of ownership concentrations on firm value have been forecasted and 
detected previously.      
The other control variables are supposed to be unchanged in the regression analysis. 
Even so, the coefficients for the ownership size control variables are in line with our 
expectations. For a given number of shares, a large number of shareholders tends to lower 
ownership concentration, and for a given number of shareholders a large number of 
shares is apt to increase ownership concentration. The significantly positive coefficient of 
total number of shares and negative coefficient of total number of shareholders support 
our findings that ownership concentration benefits firm performance
9
.    
It is always a concern that the factors which determine firm performance, such as 
board composition and board activities and ownership structure, may change over the 
year. Changes in these factors may impact upon the next year’s firm performance. 
Therefore, we replaced the current year’s explanation variables with previous year’s 
variables. Since the numbers of listing firms in 2002 and 2003 were less than those in 
2003 and 2004 respectively, the sets of observations decrease from 1975 to 1836. 
 
' ' ' '
1 1 1 1j j k k l l m mV W X Y Z eα β η γ ϕ− − − −= + + + + +  (2) 
                                                 
9
 Even the top ten total share ratios are non-linear related to firm values, the trend of those ratios are  
positively correlated with the trend of firm values, which can be known from Panel 1 of Table 4.   
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The results are arranged in Panel 2 of Table 6. By observing the t and p statistics in 
comparison with those in Panel 1, the explanation powers of board composition variables 
look likely a bit up, meanwhile, the explanation powers of board activities and ownership 
concentration variables seem to be down in some extend. We suppose that the change in 
board composition may have more influence on following year’s firm performance, while 
the change in board activities and ownership concentration may have a more immediate 
effect on the current year’s firm performance. However, the key explanation variables 
(such as the ratio of independent directors, average age of directors, frequency of board 
meetings, frequency of general shareholder meetings, tradable share ownership 
concentration and etc) are still statistically significant with original signs. The only signs 
which change are those coefficients of insignificant valuables signs change and the 
quadratic effect of U(V) shape of state shares becomes weak. Therefore, the new results 
of regression with time-lag consideration still support our findings.        
  
6. Further considerations   
The panel data contains information about the same individuals viewed at several 
moments in time. Using panel data may introduce omitted variable problems that lead to 
a biased estimation of parameters. For example, the changes of policies, trading rules, 
macroeconomic conditions and etc. over time influence firm values, but cannot be 
specified as variables in the model. The more frequently observed points are in time, the 
more likely the omitted variable problem incurs. One method to deal with this problem is 
employing the fixed-effect model (Hausman and Taylor 1981), which ignores the 
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different intercepts of each individual variable. Our data set contains the information 
companies observed in two consecutive years when the market was relatively stable and 
before the Share Split Reform in ownership restructure in 2005 as mentioned in the 
introduction. The omitted variable problem was minor. In general practice, we apply OLS 
in that we keep the meaningful different intercepts for the firms.  
It is generally argued that some independent variables measuring ownership 
concentration, board composition and activities are possibly endogenous (Demsetz, 1983; 
Hermalin and Weisback, 2000), while they have impacts on the firm value. Each of the 
variables with endogeneity may be determined by other variables in the system of 
regression. If the endogeneity heavily exits, the estimated coefficients are subject to bias. 
One practical method to deal with the endogenous problem is to apply a two-stage least 
square regression (TSLS).  
It is impossible and unnecessary to consider the endogeneity of every independent 
variable. We simply select the independent variables that are at least 5% significance in 
prior regression. However, we do not think the average age of directors is endogenous. 
We also ignore the concern with controlling variables and the variables that have a 
quadratic effect. Thus, we have five variables as endogenous regressors: the ratio of 
independent directors, the ratio of ownership representative, the top ten tradable share 
ratio, the frequency of board meetings and the frequency of general shareholder meetings. 
Because the logit model applies a binary dependent variable that can be defined from two 
classifications of values by omitting a model range, the key determined variables will be 
more explicitly detected. Thus, we conduct a set of logit modelling to define the key 
determined factors of the endogenous regressors.  
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'i i i i i
n n
L c E λ υ= + +  (3) 
 
Where L is a binary of an endogenous variable, E is a vector of determined 
variables, λ is a vector of coefficients, c is intercept, υ is the error term, i indicates a 
specific logit model, n represents the dimension of related vectors. The binary variables 
are defined by considering variable distribution by omitting a range of values around the 
mean, mode or median. Therefore, in Panel 1 of Table 7, L
1
 takes a value of one for a 
firm with more than 3 independent directors and zero for those with less than 3. In Panel 
2, L
2
 takes a value of one for a firm with the ratio of ownership representation greater 
than 60% and zero for those smaller than 50%. In Panel 3, L
3
 takes a value of one for 
firms with more than 5% of the top ten tradable share ratio and zero for those less than 
4.67%. In Panel 4, L
4
 takes a value of one for firms with more than 7 board meetings a 
year, and zero for those less than 7. In Panel 5, L
5
 takes a value of one for firms where the 
frequency of general shareholder meetings is more than 2 per year, and zero for those less 
than 2. Due to the omission of intermediate range of values, the observations in each 
panel decline to 827, 1478, 1918, 1963 and 1209 respectively.       
- insert Table 7 here - 
The likelihood estimates of the logit models are represented in Table 7. We choose 
the variables with coefficients at 10% significance or more as the determined variables of 
the endogenous regressors in the first stage of the regression model.    
'i i i i i
p pR d H ω= + +h  (4) 
The model in the second stage is the same as model (1). 
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j j k k l l m mV W X Y Z eα β η γ ϕ= + + + + +  (5) 
R is a regressor of endogeneity, which is an explanation variable existing in either 
vector W or X or Y. H is a vector of determined variables of a regressor, ħ is a vector of 
coefficients, d is intercept, ω is error term. i refers a specific model for a endogenous 
regressor. The process in choosing the endogenous variables and the determined variables 
of the regressors allows us to take necessary endogenous variables into account. 
Meanwhile, the rank and order in the model is not too high. We also apply a set of 
instrument variables to run this TSLS model.  
Panel 1 of Table 8 is the results of a multiple TSLS that takes into account the five 
endogenous regressors. In comparison to the results in Table 6, the big changes are that 
the coefficient of the average age of directors appears insignificant and the coefficient of 
general shareholder meetings becomes insignificant. By inspecting the results obtained 
from the first regression, which are reported in Table 9, we find that the adjusted R-
squares in Panel 4 and Panel 5 are only 0.0414 and 0.0267 respectively. From an 
econometrics point of view, a low adjusted R-square implies the model is a poor fit. With 
a small adjusted R-square, the significant coefficients only tell us that a large sample has 
been used in the modelling but does not mean anything. The regressors of board meetings 
and general shareholder meetings cannot be explained properly with the selected 
variables. Therefore, we conduct the second multiple TSLS that takes into account the 
first three endogenous regressors by ignoring the possibly weak endogeneity of the 
frequency of board meetings and the frequency general shareholder meetings.  
The results of the second multiple TSLS are arranged in Panel 2 of Table 8. Even 
the coefficients and significances have changed a little in comparison with those in the 
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two panels of Table 6, though our previous arguments are able to be sustained. Taking 
the necessary endogeneity into consideration does not alter our findings in the impact of 
board composition, board activities and ownership concentration on Chinese firm values.     
- insert Table 8 here - 
- insert Table 9 here - 
 
7. Conclusions   
This study is the first to provide comprehensive research into the 
relationship between board composition, board activity, ownership concentration and 
performance for Chinese listed firms during 2003-04 after China’s entry into the 
WTO and adoption of vigorous new corporate governance legislation. This paper 
also differs from prior research on corporate finance because we have conducted 
parallel and comprehensive analyses on the impact on firm value of board 
composition, board activity and ownership concentration. We applied ANOVA 
with interactive analyses, OLS modelling by taking the consideration of time-lag 
effect and TSLS modelling in dealing with endogenous problems. The reliability 
of this research is supported by consistent evidence from the different analyses. 
Our empirical findings indicated that independent directors enhanced firm 
performance. A possible explanation is that in an immature market, the role of 
outside directors is more significant than that in a developed market. However, 
we also found that the board size and gender diversity do not affect firm value. 
This result suggested that the inclusion of female directors on boards in Chinese 
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firms may only be ‘‘window dressing’’, giving the pretence of diversity and 
democracy. 
Secondly, we found that the frequency of board meetings is negatively 
associated with firm value, while the frequency of general shareholder meetings 
is positively associated with firm value. We argue that frequent board meetings 
imply internal problems or inefficient decision making. In contrast, frequent 
general shareholder meetings display both confidence on the firm’s management 
and an acceptance of broad suggestions.  
Thirdly, we found that both state ownership and total share ownership 
concentration results in an asymmetric U(V) shape of firm performance. We 
argued that for certain levels of ownership concentration of total share or state 
shares, the interests of large shareholders may not be well aligned with the 
interests of the firm. On the other hand, we found that tradable share ownership 
concentration has a linear relationship with firm value. Since large tradable 
shareholders have no power to manipulate the firm in their own interests, the 
increase of tradable share ownership concentration only mitigates free ride 
problem and thus increasing the firm’s value.  
Furthermore, our results also suggested that companies with the high levels of both 
state and total share ownership concentration have greater firm values than companies 
with only one concentration. Similarly, companies with high levels of both total share 
ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration have greater firm values 
than companies with only one concentration. Further, these companies also have greater 
firm values than companies with high levels of both total share and state ownership 
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concentration. Thus, we argue that floating non-tradable shares would be a strategy to 
improve firm and the whole market performance. 
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Table 1. Summary of statistics 
Variable Mean Std  Median Mode Minimum Maximum 
Firm value/performance       
Return_asset 0.0247 0.0626 0.0261 0.0011 -0.6121 0.3138 
Board composition       
Num_dir 9.79 2.23 9 9 5 21 
Num_indir 3.25 0.82 3 3 1 7 
Age_dir 47.84 3.98 47.80 49.00 35.38 61.78 
CEO_chair 0.0946 0.2928 0 0 0 1 
F_chair 0.0349 0.1836 0 0 0 1 
F_CEO 0.0334 0.1797 0 0 0 1 
Num_fdir 0.9317 0.9905 1 0 0 6 
Board activities       
Dir_mting 7.42 3.01 7 6 2 26 
Holder_mting 2.00 0.99 2 2 1 7 
Ratio_rep (%) 57.79 13.46 60.00 60.00 10.23 100.00 
Ownership concentration       
Top10_total (%) 61.55 12.24 63.31 60.83 7.86 89.97 
Top10_trade (%) 8.47 9.36 4.66 - 0.77 77.77 
Ratio_state (%) 34.20 26.91 35.00 - 0.00 85.00 
Others       
Total_share (million) 457.04 2921.73 256.30 200.00 50.50 125120.00 
Total_holder (thousand) 46.84 50.12 33.75 12.28 2.04 728.76 
Util_indtry 0.1073 0.3096 0 0 0 1 
Prop_indry  0.0506 0.2192 0 0 0 1 
Cong_indry 0.1240 0.3297 0 0 0 1 
Manu_indtry 0.6518 0.4765 1 1 0 1 
Comm_indry 0.0663 0.2489 0 0 0 1 
Summary of statistics of total 1975 sets of observations of firms listed on either Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange in 2003 or 2004. 
Return_asset is annual net profit divided by the average book value of assets at the beginning and end of year. Num_dir is the number 
of directors. Num_indir is the number of independent directors. Age_dir is the average age of directors. CEO_chair is a dummy of 
duality of CEO and chairman. F_chair is a dummy of female chairman. F_CEO is a dummy of female CEO. Num_fdir is the number 
of female directors. Dir_mting is the frequency of board meetings. Holder_mting is the frequency of shareholder general meetings. 
Ratio_rep is the ratio of shares owned by the shareholders participated in the shareholder general meetings to the total shares 
outstanding. Top10_total is the ratio of shares held by the top ten total shareholders to the total shares outstanding. Top10_trade is the 
ratio of tradable shares held by the top ten tradable shareholders to the total tradable shares. Ratio_state is the ratio of state-owned 
shares to total shares outstanding. Total_share (million) is total number of shares outstanding. Total_holder (thousand) is the total 
number of shareholders. Util_indtry is the industry of utility. Prop_indry is the industry of property. Cong_indry is the industry of 
conglomeration. Manu_indtry is the industry of manufacture. Comm_indry is the industry of commerce.  
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Table 2. ANOVA analyses on the impact of board composition on firm value 
Panel 1: Firm value by number of directors  Panel 2: Firm value by number of independent directors 
 Return_asset   Return_asset 
Num_dir Obs. Mean Std  Num_indir Obs. Mean Std 
≤8 374 0.0205 0.0667  ≤2 248 0.0092 0.0817 
9-10 949 0.0250 0.0655  3 1148 0.0251 0.0622 
≥11 652 0.0267 0.0533  ≥4 579 0.0306 0.0519 
  F=1.05 P<0.3490    F=10.32 P<0.0001 
Pane1 3: Firm value by average age of directors  Pane1 4: Firm value by duality of CEO and chairman 
 Return_asset   Return_asset 
Age_dir Obs. Mean Std  CEO_chair  Obs. Mean Std 
<45 488 0.0147 0.0693  Yes  186 0.0255 0.0657 
45-50 893 0.0235 0.0610  No 1789 0.0246 0.0622 
>50 594 0.0348 0.0574    F=0.03 P<0.8579 
  F=14.41 P<0.0001      
Panel 5: Firm value by female chairman  Panel 6: Firm value by female CEO 
 Return_asset   Return_asset 
F_chair Obs. Mean Std  F_CEO  Obs. Mean Std 
Yes  69 0.0285 0.0424  Yes  66 0.0246 0.0627 
No 1906 0.0246 0.0632  No 1909 0.0270 0.0579 
  F=0.26 P<0.6086    F=0.09 P<0.7598 
         
Panel 7: Firm value by female director presence   
 Return_asset    
F_dir Obs. Mean Std      
Yes  1179 0.0226 0.0614      
No 796 0.0279 0.0641      
  F=3.39 P<0.0659      
Return_asset is annual net profit divided by the average book value of assets at the beginning and end of year. Num_dir is the number 
of directors. Num_indir is the number of independent directors. Age_dir is the average age of directors. CEO_chair is a dummy for 
duality of CEO and chairman. F_chair is a dummy of female chairman. F_CEO is a dummy of female CEO. F_dir is a dummy of 
female director presence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. ANOVA analyses on the impact of board activities on firm value 
Panel 1: Firm value by frequency of board meetings 
  
Panel 2: Firm value by frequency of shareholder general 
meetings 
 Return_asset   Return_asset 
Dir_mting Obs. Mean Std  Holder_mting Obs. Mean Std 
≤6 866 0.0296 0.0598  ≤1 704 0.0204 0.0613 
7-9 779 0.0251 0.0584  2 766 0.0253 0.0671 
> 9 330 0.0110 0.0757  ≥3 505 0.0297 0.0564 
  F=10.65 P<0.0001    F=3.27 P<0.0383 
Pane1 3: Firm value by ratio of shareholder representative    
 Return_asset    
Ratio_rep (%) Obs. Mean Std      
<50 502 0.0111 0.0640      
50-60 496 0.0156 0.0709      
>60 977 0.0363 0.0546      
  F=35.03 P<0.0001      
Return_asset is annual net profit divided by the average book value of assets at the beginning and end of year. Dir_mting is the 
frequency of board meetings. Holder_mting is the frequency of shareholder general meetings. Ratio_rep is the ratio of shares owned 
by the shareholders participated in the shareholder general meetings to the total shares outstanding. 
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Table 4. ANOVA analyses on the impact of ownership concentration on firm value 
Panel 1: Firm value by the ratio of top ten ownership    Panel 2: Firm value by the ratio of top ten tradable share 
ownership   
Top10_total (%) Return_asset  Top10_trade (%) Return_asset 
Quintuple Range Obs. Mean Std  Quintuple Range Obs Mean Std 
1 <52.16 395 0.0136 0.0593  1 <2.52 395 0.0024 0.0575 
2 52.16-60.45 395 0.0113 0.0647  2 2.52-3.76 395 0.0094 0.0677 
3 60.54-65.75 395 0.0212 0.0637  3 3.76-6.04 395 0.0193 0.0588 
4 65.75-71.74 395 0.0221 0.0593  4 6.04-13.23 395 0.0341 0.0566 
5 >71.74 395 0.0553 0.0554  5 >13.23 395 0.0583 0.0555 
   F=33.60 P<0.0001     F=55.60 P<0.0001 
           
Panel 3: Firm value by the ratio of state ownership   
Ratio_state (%) Return_asset     
Range Obs. Mean Std        
=0 547 0.0232 0.0671        
0< & <50 745 0.016 0.0643        
≥50 683 0.0354 0.0548        
  F=18.47 P<0.0001        
Return_asset is annual net profit divided by the average book value of assets at the beginning and end of year. Top10_total is the ratio 
of shares held by the top ten total shareholders to total shares outstanding.  Top10_trade is the ratio of tradable shares held by the top 
ten tradable shareholders to total tradable shares. Ratio_state is the ratio of state-owned shares to total shares outstanding. 
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Table 5. ANOVA analyses on the interactive effects of ownership concentration on firm value 
Panel 1: Firm value by the interactive determination of state share and total share ownership concentration 
Ratio_state (%)  Top10_total (%)    
Level Quintuple  1 2 3 4 5 Total   
 Range  <52.16 52.16-60.45 60.54-65.75 65.75-71.74 >71.74 7.86-89.97 F= P< 
1 0 Obs 119 103 103 111 111 547   
  Mean 0.0179 0.0099 0.0172 0.0193 0.051 0.0232 6.53 0.0001 
  Std 0.0530 0.0734 0.0850 0.0650 0.0493 0.0671   
2 0< & <50 Obs 269 179 135 86 76 745   
  Mean 0.0125 0.0064 0.0187 0.0190 0.042 0.0160 4.52 0.0013 
  Std 0.0615 0.0692 0.0696 0.0432 0.0664 0.0643   
3 ≥50 Obs 7 113 157 198 208 683   
  Mean -0.0168 0.0204 0.0256 0.0252 0.0624 0.0354 21.66 0.0001 
  Std 0.0731 0.0455 0.0364 0.0621 0.0532 0.0548   
Total  Obs 395 395 395 395 395    
  Mean 0.0136 0.0113 0.0212 0.0221 0.0553  33.60 0.0001 
  Std 0.0593 0.0647 0.0637 0.0593 0.0554    
 F=  1.65 3.55 3.11 3.97 4.32 18.47   
 P<  0.1934 0.0297 0.0457 0.0196 0.0139 0.0001   
           
Panel 2: Firm value by the interactive determination of total share and tradable share ownership concentration 
Top10_total (%)  Top10_trade (%)    
Quintuple Quintuple  1 2 3 4 5 Total   
 Range  <2.52 2.52-3.76 3.76-6.04 6.04-13.23 >13.23 0.77-77.77 F= P< 
1 <52.16 Obs 121 71 86 77 40 395    
  Mean -0.0035 -0.0003 0.0174 0.0342 0.0425 0.0136 5.48 0.0001 
  Std 0.0682 0.0726 0.0518 0.0327 0.0323 0.0593    
2 52.16-60.45 Obs 85 94 93 81 42 395    
  Mean 0.002 0.0016 0.0115 0.0244 0.0264 0.0113 2.42 0.0484 
  Std 0.0547 0.0616 0.0697 0.0567 0.0854 0.0647    
3 60.54-65.75 Obs 80 88 86 84 57 395    
  Mean 0.0061 0.0121 0.0230 0.0268 0.0454 0.0212 3.91 0.004 
  Std 0.0482 0.0775 0.0339 0.0868 0.0436 0.0637    
4 65.75-71.74 Obs 70 86 74 79 86 395    
  Mean -0.0025 0.0127 0.0133 0.0339 0.0481 0.0221 11.87 0.0001 
  Std 0.0569 0.0533 0.0804 0.0315 0.051 0.0593    
5 >71.74 Obs 39 56 56 74 170 395    
  Mean 0.023 0.0252 0.0377 0.0531 0.0794 0.0553 20.13 0.0001 
  Std 0.0405 0.0726 0.0373 0.0488 0.0487 0.0554    
Total 7.86-89.97 Obs 395 395 395 395 395     
  Mean 0.0024 0.0094 0.0193 0.0341 0.0583  55.6 0.0001 
  Std 0.0575 0.0677 0.0588 0.0566 0.0555     
 F=  2.44 2.21 2.99 3.61 13.37 33.6    
 P<  0.0465 0.0673 0.0188 0.0066 0.0001 0.0001     
Return_asset is annual net profit divided by the average book value of assets at the beginning and end of year. Top10_total is the ratio 
of shares held by the top ten total shareholders to total shares outstanding.  Top10_trade is the ratio of tradable shares held by the top 
ten tradable shareholders to total tradable shares. Ratio_state is the ratio of state-owned shares to total shares outstanding. 
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Table 6. Results of OLS regression analyses  
Panel 1 Panel 2 
Dependent Variable Return_asset Dependent Variable Return_asset 
Independent Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Independent Variable Coefficient t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.3339 -4.40 0.01 Intercept -0.6410 -4.87 0.01 
Board composition    Board composition    
Num_dir (logarithm)  0.0080 1.27 0.20 Num_dir-1 (logarithm)  0.0132 1.18 0.24 
Ratio_indir 0.0870 3.50 0.01 Ratio_indir-1 0.1541 3.79 0.01 
Age_dir (logarithm) 0.0405 2.41 0.02 Age_dir-1 (logarithm) 0.0793 2.72 0.01 
CEO_chair (dummy) 0.0014 0.32 0.75 CEO_chair-1 (dummy) -0.0006 -0.08 0.94 
F_chair  (dummy) 0.0057 0.78 0.43 F_chair-1  (dummy) -0.0164 -1.29 0.20 
F_CEO  (dummy) 0.0048 0.65 0.52 F_CEO-1  (dummy) 0.0164 1.15 0.25 
F_dir  (dummy) -0.0022 -0.81 0.42 F_dir-1  (dummy) 0.0029 0.59 0.55 
 Board activities     Board activities    
Dir_mting (logarithm) -0.0195 -4.95 0.01 Dir_mting-1 (logarithm) -0.0163 -2.38 0.02 
Holder_mting (logarithm) 0.0078 2.68 0.01 Holder_mting-1 (logarithm) 0.0056 1.99 0.05 
Ratio_rep 0.0091 4.19 0.01 Ratio_rep-1 0.0082 2.14 0.03 
Ownership concentration    Ownership concentration    
Top10_total  -0.0914 -1.23 0.22 Top10_total -1 -0.0789 -0.63 0.53 
Top10_total2 0.0144 0.22 0.83 Top10_total2-1 0.0230 0.20 0.84 
Ratio_state  -0.0503 -2.56 0.01 Ratio_state-1  -0.0328 -0.94 0.35 
Ratio_state2 0.0846 2.83 0.01 Ratio_state2-1 0.0614 1.14 0.25 
Top10_trade  0.1438 8.48 0.01 Top10_trade-1  0.1372 3.88 0.01 
Others    Others    
Total_share (logarithm) 0.0162 5.81 0.01 Total_share-1 (logarithm) 0.0267 5.34 0.01 
Total_holder (logarithm) -0.0128 -5.17 0.01 Total_holder-1 (logarithm) -0.0216 -4.71 0.01 
Util_indtry (dummy) 0.0028 0.40 0.69 Util_indtry-1 (dummy) -0.0038 -0.31 0.76 
Cong_indry (dummy) -0.0085 -1.23 0.22 Cong_indry-1 (dummy) -0.0167 -1.37 0.17 
Manu_indtry (dummy) -0.0052 -0.86 0.39 Manu_indtry-1 (dummy) -0.0133 -1.23 0.22 
Comm_indry (dummy) -0.0067 -0.87 0.39 Comm_indry-1 (dummy) -0.0051 -0.38 0.71 
Adj R-Square  0.1561  Adj R-Square  0.1507  
Observation   1975  Observation   1836  
Return_asset is annual net profit divided by the average book value of assets at the beginning and end of year. Num_dir is the number 
of directors. Ratio_indir is the ratio of number of independent directors to number of total directors. Age_dir is average age of 
directors. CEO_chair is a dummy of duality of CEO and chairman. F_chair is a dummy of female chairman. F_CEO is a dummy of 
female CEO. F_dir is a dummy of female director presence. Dir_mting is the frequency of board meetings. Holder_mting is the 
frequency of shareholder general meetings. Ratio_rep is the ratio of shares owned by the shareholders participated in the shareholder 
general meetings to the total shares outstanding. Top10_total is the ratio of shares held by the top ten total shareholders to the total 
shares outstanding. Top10_total2 is the square of Top10_total. Top10_trade is the ratio of tradable shares held by the top ten tradable 
shareholders to the total tradable shares. Ratio_state is the ratio of state-owned shares to total shares outstanding. Ratio_state2 is the 
square of Ratio_state. Total_share (million) is total number of shares outstanding. Total_holder (thousand) is the total number of 
shareholders. Util_indtry is the industry of utility. Prop_indry is the industry of property. Cong_indry is the industry of 
conglomeration. Manu_indtry is the industry of manufacture. Comm_indry is the industry of commerce. The word “logarithm” in the 
brackets means the value of the variable is in logarithm form. The word “dummy” in the brackets means the value being one if the 
statement is affirmed and zero otherwise. The subscript of -1 refers to one year lag. When a p-value is smaller than 0.01, it is 
represented as 0.01. 
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Table 7. Maximum likelihood estimates using logit model analysis  
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 Panel 5 
Dependent variables 
 (binary) 
L1 = 1, if 
Num_indir > 3; 
L1 = 0, if 
Num_indir <3 
L2 = 1, if 
Ratio_rep>60%; 
L2 = 0, if 
Ratio_rep<50% 
L3 = 1, if 
Top10_trade>5%; 
L3 = 0, if 
Top10_trade<4.67% 
L4 = 1, if 
Dir_mting>7; 
L4 = 1, if 
Dir_mting<7 
L5 = 1, if 
Holder_mting>2; 
L5 = 1 if 
Holder_mting<2 
Independent variables Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Intercept -28.2059 0.00 -14.6443 0.01 -7.7835 0.01 3.0746 0.06 -9.5874 0.01 
Num_dir (logarithm) 10.4379 0.00 1.3079 0.12 0.1747 0.59 -0.6967 0.05 -0.3660 0.41 
Ratio_indir   -0.3445 0.63 -0.2128 0.45 0.2047 0.51 1.4083 0.01 
CEO_chair (dummy) 0.3423 0.45 0.0232 0.96 0.0716 0.69 0.2669 0.15 -0.098 0.66 
F_chair  (dummy) 2.1101 0.05 -0.3077 0.25 -0.0345 0.75 -0.0547 0.64 0.0384 0.79 
F_CEO (dummy)   -0.1670 0.78 0.7633 0.01 0.0009 1.00 0.0732 0.85 
F_dir (dummy) 0.4878 0.54 2.0488 0.01 -0.2376 0.40 -0.4405 0.17 0.3044 0.39 
Dir_mting (logarithm)         2.8965 0.01 
Holder_mting (logarithm)   -0.2750 0.30 0.0960 0.37 1.5985 0.00   
Top10_total -0.8384 0.49 16.8132 0.01 -0.2781 0.58 -0.7006 0.18 0.8666 0.19 
Top10_trade -0.8689 0.59 -2.9041 0.09   -0.0533 0.94 -0.3603 0.68 
Ratio_state -0.3444 0.49 1.2005 0.02 -0.2864 0.15 -0.3913 0.07 -0.2923 0.27 
Total_share (logarithm) 0.6648 0.01 0.4584 0.13 1.0656 0.01 0.0245 0.83 0.2119 0.15 
Total_holder (logarithm) -0.5889 0.03 0.2177 0.38 -1.2920 0.01 -0.1713 0.10 -0.2266 0.08 
Return_asset 4.5372 0.06 7.3000 0.01 10.7339 0.01 -3.5003 0.00 4.1915 0.01 
Util_indtry (dummy) -1.3576 0.21 -1.6963 0.01 0.0550 0.84 -0.2062 0.49 0.1271 0.73 
Cong_indry (dummy) -2.0585 0.06 -0.8765 0.15 -0.2045 0.45 -0.6482 0.03 0.4154 0.25 
Manu_indtry (dummy) -1.1860 0.25 -0.4414 0.41 0.2945 0.21 -1.0206 0.00 0.7010 0.03 
Comm_indry (dummy) -1.2675 0.26 -0.4889 0.52 0.2521 0.40 -0.7690 0.02 -0.3470 0.40 
Global null hypothesis test  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
Observation  827  1478  1918  1631  1209 
Num_dir is the number of directors. Ratio_indir is the ratio of number of independent directors to number of total directors. 
CEO_chair is a dummy of duality of CEO and chairman. F_chair is a dummy of female chairman. F_CEO is a dummy of female CEO. 
F_dir is a dummy of female director presence. Dir_mting is the frequency of board meetings. Holder_mting is the frequency of 
shareholder general meetings. Top10_total is the ratio of shares held by the top ten total shareholders to the total shares outstanding. 
Top10_trade is the ratio of tradable shares held by the top ten tradable shareholders to the total tradable shares. Ratio_state is the ratio 
of state-owned shares to total shares outstanding. Total_share (million) is total number of shares outstanding. Total_holder (thousand) 
is the total number of shareholders. Return_asset is annual net profit divided by the average book value of assets at the beginning and 
end of year. Util_indtry is the industry of utility. Prop_indry is the industry of property. Cong_indry is the industry of conglomeration. 
Manu_indtry is the industry of manufacture. Comm_indry is the industry of commerce. The word “logarithm” in the brackets means 
the value of the variable is in logarithm form. The word “dummy” in the brackets means the value being one if the statement is 
affirmed and zero otherwise. When a p-value is smaller than 0.01, it is represented as 0.01. 
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Table 8. Results of 2SLS regression analyses  
 Panel 1 Panel 2 
Endogenous Variable 
Ratio_indir, Ratio_rep, Top10_trade  
Dir_mting (logarithm), Holder_mting (logarithm),  
Ratio_indir, Ratio_rep, Top10_trade   
 
Dependent Variable Return_asset Return_asset 
Independent Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Coefficient t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.1355 -1.1 0.27 -0.3851 -5.12 0.01 
Board composition       
Num_dir (logarithm)  0.0072 0.93 0.35 0.0037 0.54 0.59 
Ratio_indir 0.1007 3.38 0.01 0.0799 3.04 0.01 
Age_dir (logarithm) 0.0159 0.76 0.45 0.0352 1.98 0.05 
CEO_chair (dummy) 0.0033 0.59 0.55 -0.0011 -0.23 0.81 
F_chair  (dummy) 0.0047 0.55 0.58 0.0034 0.44 0.66 
F_CEO  (dummy) 0.0120 1.37 0.17 0.0107 1.35 0.18 
F_dir  (dummy) 0.0047 0.55 0.58 0.0034 0.44 0.66 
 Board activities       
Dir_mting (logarithm) -0.0805 -2.74 0.01 -0.0184 -4.44 0.01 
Holder_mting (logarithm) 0.0276 1.35 0.18 0.0075 2.44 0.02 
Ratio_rep 0.0013 3.09 0.01 0.0018 5.61 0.01 
Ownership concentration       
Top10_total  -0.0432 -0.51 0.61 -0.0456 -0.59 0.55 
Top10_total2 0.0339 0.44 0.66 0.0308 0.45 0.66 
Ratio_state  -0.0419 -1.83 0.07 -0.0469 -2.26 0.02 
Ratio_state2 0.0718 2.06 0.04 0.0807 2.55 0.01 
Top10_trade  0.1298 6.64 0.01 0.1195 6.81 0.01 
Others       
Total_share (logarithm) 0.0164 5.01 0.01 0.0171 5.83 0.01 
Total_holder (logarithm) -0.0149 -5.11 0.01 -0.0151 -5.7 0.01 
Util_indtry (dummy) -0.0041 -0.49 0.62 -0.0012 -0.17 0.87 
Cong_indry (dummy) -0.0102 -1.11 0.27 -0.0004 -0.06 0.95 
Manu_indtry (dummy) -0.0184 -2.13 0.03 -0.0088 -1.37 0.17 
Comm_indry (dummy) -0.0175 -1.69 0.09 -0.0003 -0.03 0.98 
Adj R-Square  0.1423   0.1674  
Observation   1975   1795  
Return_asset is annual net profit divided by the average book value of assets at the beginning and end of year. Num_dir is the number 
of directors. Ratio_indir is the ratio of number of independent directors to number of total directors. Age_dir is average age of 
directors. CEO_chair is a dummy of duality of CEO and chairman. F_chair is a dummy of female chairman. F_CEO is a dummy of 
female CEO. F_dir is a dummy of female director presence. Dir_mting is the frequency of board meetings. Holder_mting is the 
frequency of shareholder general meetings. Ratio_rep is the ratio of shares owned by the shareholders participated in the shareholder 
general meetings to the total shares outstanding. Top10_total is the ratio of shares held by the top ten total shareholders to the total 
shares outstanding. Top10_total2 is the square of Top10_total. Top10_trade is the ratio of tradable shares held by the top ten tradable 
shareholders to the total tradable shares. Ratio_state is the ratio of state-owned shares to total shares outstanding. Ratio_state2 is the 
square of Ratio_state. Total_share (million) is total number of shares outstanding. Total_holder (thousand) is the total number of 
shareholders. Util_indtry is the industry of utility. Prop_indry is the industry of property. Cong_indry is the industry of 
conglomeration. Manu_indtry is the industry of manufacture. Comm_indry is the industry of commerce. The word “logarithm” in the 
brackets means the value of the variable is in logarithm form. The word “dummy” in the brackets means the value being one if the 
statement is affirmed and zero otherwise. When a p-value is smaller than 0.01, it is represented as 0.01. 
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Table 9. Results from first stage in 2SLS regression analyses 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 Panel 5 
Dependent variables 
  
Ratio_indir            
 
Ratio_rep 
 
Top10_trade 
 
Dir_mting 
(logarithm) 
Holder_mting 
(logarithm) 
Independent variables Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Intercept -0.7486 0.01 -0.2838 0.72 -0.5048 0.01 2.2278 0.00 -0.5495 0.14 
Num_dir (logarithm) 0.7971 0.01         
Ratio_indir         0.3542 0.01 
F_chair  (dummy)   1.9047 0.02       
F_CEO (dummy) 0.0547 0.02         
Dir_mting (logarithm)         0.5795 0.01 
Holder_mting (logarithm)       0.3206 0.00   
Top10_total   9.3482 0.01 0.0993 0.01 -0.1659 0.01   
Top10_trade   -2.2767 0.05     -0.0585 0.78 
Ratio_state   3.1359 0.01 -0.0171 0.02   -0.0329 0.40 
Total_share (logarithm) 0.0100 0.21   0.0583 0.01     
Total_holder (logarithm) -0.0101 0.13   -0.0578 0.01 -0.0292 0.00 -0.0437 0.00 
Return_asset 0.3978 0.07 5.9802 0.01   -1.1090 0.00 0.1733 0.80 
Util_indtry (dummy)   -0.9767 0.05       
Cong_indry (dummy) -0.0267 0.04         
Manu_indtry (dummy)     0.0033 0.39 -0.1074 0.01 0.0983 0.01 
Adj R-Square 0.4876  0.7508  0.2307  0.0414  0.0267  
Observation 1975  1975  1975  1975  1975  
Num_dir is the number of directors. Ratio_indir is the ratio of number of independent directors to number of total directors. F_chair is 
a dummy of female chairman. F_CEO is a dummy of female CEO. Dir_mting is the frequency of board meetings. Holder_mting is the 
frequency of shareholder general meetings. Top10_total is the ratio of shares held by the top ten shareholders to the total shares 
outstanding. Top10_trade is the ratio of tradable shares held by the top ten tradable total shareholders to the total tradable shares. 
Ratio_state is the ratio of state-owned shares to total shares outstanding. Total_share (million) is total number of shares outstanding. 
Total_holder (thousand) is the total number of shareholders. Return_asset is annual net profit divided by the average book value of 
assets at the beginning and end of year. Ratio_rep is the ratio of shares owned by the shareholders participated in the shareholder 
general meetings to the total shares outstanding. Util_indtry is the industry of utility. Cong_indry is the industry of conglomeration. 
Manu_indtry is the industry of manufacture. The word “logarithm” in the brackets means the value of the variable is in logarithm form. 
The word “dummy” in the brackets means the value being one if the statement is affirmed and zero otherwise. When a p-value is 
smaller than 0.01, it is represented as 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
